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1 Introduction
The security of cryptographic protocols generally depends upon the truth of
several assumptions: that the agents are computationally limited and that cer-
tain computational problems are intractable given these computational lim-
its. In protocols based on public key encryption schemes such as RSA, for
example, decryption of messages is tractable for the intended recipient but
assumed to be impossible for an eavesdropper, because it requires factoring a
large product of primes, a problem assumed to be intractable. There do exist,
however, unconditionally secure protocols, whose security does not rely upon
such assumptions. These protocols can be shown to be secure even against
adversaries with unlimited computational powers, because they ensure that
the adversary cannot learn secrets for information theoretic rather than com-
putational reasons.
A popular approach to the veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols has been
to analyse them in terms of information ﬂow as expressed using logics of
knowledge and belief [3,12]. In general, the semantics of these logics do not
capture the dimension of computational complexity upon which the security of
the protocols rest: instead, they treat agents as purely information theoretic
reasoners, having computational powers extending even beyond the recursive
enumerable. However, this very feature makes these logics a highly appropriate
tool for the analysis of unconditionally secure protocols.
In this paper, we consider the application of the logic of knowledge to un-
conditionally secure protocols based on the exchange of information grounded
in correlations arising from a deck of cards having been dealt to the agents. A
player can communicate secret bits such as card ownership to another player
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without revealing these secrets to a third player (eavesdropper). This has
been investigated in [6,16,10,1,17]. A typical example is the ‘Russian Cards
Problem’: two players each draw three cards from a pack of seven cards, and
the remaining player (eavesdropper) gets the last card. The ‘problem’ is to
ﬁnd protocols that allow the sender and receiver to learn each other’s hand of
cards, without revealing this information to the eavesdropper. In [16], proto-
cols of length two are presented that solve this problem. Protocols of length
greater than two are investigated in [17].
In such card protocols, the required postconditions are not always clear or
not easy to verify, publicly known protocol features may involve fairly complex
nested dynamic epistemic formulas, and enumeration of all possible protocols
is an issue as well. Model checkers are promising tools with which to address
these complexities. A model checking analysis has been partially carried out
for the Russian Cards problem in [20]: epistemic properties of the scenario are
translated into (linear time) LTL, and then veriﬁed using the model checker
SPIN. A deal of cards together with a number of announcements corresponds
to a time line. Uncertainty of the agents is represented by exploiting local
propositions proposed in [4], see also [13]. This approach to model checking
epistemic logic has a number of disadvantages: the need for translation means
that the epistemic aspects are only implicit in the analysis, it requires that
the appropriate local propositions – which may be diﬃcult to identify – be
explicitly provided by the user, and in the case of negative occurrences of
the knowledge operator, multiple runs of the model checker are necessary to
conduct the veriﬁcation.
In this contribution, we take a more direct approach, verifying protocol
properties in model checkers which work with epistemic logic explicitly. We
conduct a comparative study of a number of systems, based on a variety of
approaches to representing the evolution of knowledge: combinations of the
logic of knowledge with linear and/or branching time [5,9,14], and dynamic
epistemic logics [8,2,15]. Speciﬁcally, we consider the model checkers MCK
[7] which deals with the logic of knowledge and both linear and branching
time using BDD based algorithms, MCMAS [11] which handles knowledge
and branching time using BDD based algorithms, and DEMO [18], which is
an explicit state model checker based on a dynamic epistemic logic.
We have selected one speciﬁc Russian Cards protocol, the ‘ﬁve hands pro-
tocol’, implemented it in these quite diﬀerent dedicated ‘epistemic’ model
checkers, and veriﬁed its relevant properties. This involved reinterpreting dy-
namic epistemic concepts in temporal epistemic terms; this theoretical exer-
cise was carried out successfully and increased our understanding of dynamic
epistemic features. All three implementations were carried out within a rea-
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sonable development time and all were successful. Some additional Russian
Cards protocol features, in particular for protocols of length greater than two,
have been kept outside this comparison. Also, incorrect protocols (such as
for non-solutions of the Russian Cards problem) can be easily shown to be
so by establishing failure of (commonly known or other) epistemic conditions.
This only requires (almost) trivial changes in the scripts presented below for
a correct protocol.
In Section 2 we present the Russian Cards problem. Sections 3 to 5 are ded-
icated to the implementation of the ‘ﬁve hands’ protocol for the Russian Cards
problem in the model checkers, respectively, MCK, DEMO, and MCMAS. Sec-
tion 6 compares the results. The MCK, DEMO, and MCMAS input scripts
can be found on http://www.cs.otago.ac.nz/staffpriv/hans/aoard/.
2 Russian Cards
From a pack of seven known cards two players each draw three cards and a
third player gets the remaining card. How can the players with three cards
openly inform each other about their cards, without the third player learning
from any of their cards who holds it?
This ‘Russian Cards’ problem originated at the Moscow Math Olympiad
2000. Call the players Anne, Bill and Cath, and the cards 0, ..., 6, and suppose
Anne holds {0, 1, 2}, Bill {3, 4, 5}, and Cath card 6. For the hand of cards
{0, 1, 2}, write 012 instead, for the card deal, write 012.345.6, etc. Assume
from now on that 012.345.6 is the actual card deal. All announcements must
be public and truthful. There are not many things Anne can safely say. Ob-
viously, she cannot say “I have 0 or 6,” because then Cath learns that Anne
has 0. But Anne can also not say “I have 0 or 3,” because Anne does not
know if Cath has 3 or another card, and if Cath had card 3, she would have
learnt that Anne has card 0. But Anne can also not say “I have 0 or 1.” Even
though Anne holds both 0 and 1, so that she does not appear to risk that
Cath eliminates either card and thus gains knowledge about single card own-
ership (weaker knowledge, about alternatives, is allowed), Cath knows that
Anne will not say anything from which Cath may learn her cards. And thus
Cath can conclude that Anne will only say “I have 0 or 1” if she actually holds
both 0 and 1. And in that way Cath learns two cards at once! The appar-
ent contradiction between Cath not knowing and Cath knowing is not really
there, because these observations are about diﬀerent information states: it is
merely the case that announcements may induce further updates that contain
yet other information.
Whenever after Anne’s announcement it is (at least) not common knowl-
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edge to Anne, Bill, and Cath, that Cath remains ignorant of any of Anne’s
or Bill’s cards, this may be informative to Cath after all. A typical example
is when Anne says that she either holds 012 or not any of those cards, after
which Bill says that Cath holds card 6. For details, see [16]. Indeed, a solu-
tion requirement is that Cath’s ignorance remains public knowledge after any
announcement. Such announcements are called safe.
A solution to the Russian Cards problem is a sequence of safe announce-
ments after which it is commonly known to Anne and Bill (not necessarily
including Cath) that Anne knows Bill’s hand and Bill knows Anne’s hand.
This (instance of a) ﬁve hands protocol is a solution:
Anne says “My hand of cards is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, 246,” after which
Bill says “Cath has card 6.”
Note that Bill’s announcement is equivalent to “My hand of cards is one of
345, 125, 024.” After this sequence, it is even publicly known that Anne knows
Bill’s hand and Bill knows Anne’s hand. If we extend Anne’s announcement
with one more hand, namely 245, and if it is public knowledge that the pro-
tocols used by Anne and Bill are of ﬁnite length (so may consist of more than
two announcements), then it is ‘merely’ common knowledge to Anne and Bill
that they know each other’s hand, but (disregarding further analysis) Cath
considers it possible that they do not know each other’s hand of cards. This is
a useful security feature for Anne and Bill, as Cath plays the role of the eaves-
dropper. A further postcondition is that all safe announcements by Anne
ensure at least one safe response from Bill, and vice versa. This recursive
requirement results in a more complex condition. See [17].
Public announcement logic The Russian Cards problem can be modelled
in public announcement logic with common knowledge. We give a concise
overview of the language and its semantics.
Given are a set of agents N and a set of atoms P . An epistemic model M =
〈S,∼, V 〉 consists of a domain S of (factual) states (or ‘worlds’), accessibility
∼ : N → P(S × S), and a valuation V : P → P(S). For s ∈ S, (M, s) is an
epistemic state. For ∼ (n) we write ∼n, and for V (p) we write Vp. So, access
∼ can be seen as a set of equivalence relations ∼n, and V as a set of valuations
Vp. For (
⋃
n∈G ∼n)∗, write ∼G: this is access to interpret common knowledge
for group G.
The language of public announcements is inductively deﬁned as
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Knϕ | CGϕ | [ϕ]ψ
where p ∈ P , n ∈ N , and G ⊆ N are arbitrary. For Knϕ, read ‘agent n
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knows formula ϕ’. For CGϕ, read ‘group of agents G commonly know formula
ϕ’. For [ϕ]ψ, read ‘after public announcement of ϕ, formula ψ (is true)’. The
eﬀect of the public announcement of ϕ is the restriction of the epistemic state
to all worlds where ϕ holds. So, ‘announce ϕ’ can be seen as an information
state transformer, with a corresponding dynamic modal operator [ϕ].
The semantics is as follows. Given is an epistemic model M = 〈S,∼, V 〉.
M, s |= p iﬀ s ∈ Vp
M, s |= ¬ϕ iﬀ M, s |= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iﬀ M, s |= ϕ and M, s |= ψ
M, s |= Knϕ iﬀ for all t ∈ S : s ∼n t implies M, t |= ϕ
M, s |= CGϕ iﬀ for all t ∈ S : s ∼G t implies M, t |= ϕ
M, s |= [ϕ]ψ iﬀ M, s |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, s |= ψ
Model M |ϕ = 〈S ′,∼′, V ′〉 is deﬁned as
S ′ ≡ {s′ ∈ S | M, s′ |= ϕ}
∼′n ≡ ∼n ∩ (S ′ × S ′)
V ′p ≡ Vp ∩ S ′
In other words: the model M |ϕ is the model M restricted to all the states
where ϕ holds, including access between states. Formula ϕ is valid on model
M , notation M |= ϕ, if and only if for all states s in the domain of M :
M, s |= ϕ. Formula ϕ is valid, notation |= ϕ, if and only if for all models M :
M |= ϕ.
We now model the Russian Cards problem in this logic. Given a stack of
known cards and some players, the players blindly draw some cards from the
stack. In a state where cards are dealt in that way, but where no game actions
of whatever kind have been done, it is commonly known what the cards are,
that they are all diﬀerent, how many cards each player holds, and that players
only know their own cards. From the last it follows that two deals are the
same for an agent, if she holds the same cards in both, and if all players hold
the same number of cards in both. This induces an equivalence relation on
deals.
An epistemic model (Rus, 012.345.6) for the deal 012.345.6 that we inves-
tigate, encodes the knowledge of the players Anne, Bill and Cath (a, b, c) in
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this card deal. It consists of
(
7
3
)(
4
3
)(
1
1
)
= 140 deals. For each player, access
between states is induced by the equivalence above, for example, 012.345.6 ∼a
012.346.5 says that Anne cannot tell these two card deals apart (as her hand
is 012 in both). Facts about card ownership written as qn, for ‘card q is held
by player n’. The valuation V0a of fact 0a (Anne holds card 0) consists of all
60 deals where 0 occurs in Anne’s hand, etc.
After a sequence of announcements that is a solution of the Russian Cards
problem, it should hold that Anne knows Bill’s cards, that Bill knows Anne’s
cards, and that Cath doesn’t know any of Anne’s or Bill’s cards:
a knows bs ≡ ∧q=0..6(Kaqb ∨Ka¬qb)
b knows as ≡ ∧q=0..6(Kbqa ∨Kb¬qa)
c ignorant ≡ ∧q=0..6(¬Kcqa ∧ ¬Kcqb)
We suggested in the previous section that these conditions are too weak. This
can be exempliﬁed by the observation that, e.g.,
Rus, 012.345.6 |= [Ka(012a ∨ (¬0a ∧ ¬1a ∧ ¬2a))][c ignorant]¬c ignorant
After Anne says that her hand is 012 or that she does not hold any of those
cards, c ignorant is true, but a further update with that (in other words: when
Cath can assume that this is true) makes Cath learn some of Anne’s cards,
so that c ignorant is false. The actually required postconditions avoiding such
complications are: after every announcement of an executed protocol, it is
publicly known that Cath is ignorant, and after the execution of the entire
protocol it is commonly known to Anne and Bill that: Anne knows that
Bill knows her hand of cards, and Bill knows that Anne knows his hand of
cards. Also using that Cab(Kba knows bs ∧ Kab knows as) is equivalent to
Cab(a knows bs ∧ b knows as) this is formalized as
Cab(a knows bs ∧ b knows as)
Cabcc ignorant
Concerning protocols: when Anne announces ‘ϕ’, this should be interpreted as
‘Kaϕ’ given that she knows what she says, and even as ‘Kaϕ∧[Kaϕ]Kac ignorant’
given her intention, and beyond that even as ‘Kaϕ ∧ [Kaϕ]CabcKac ignorant’
given that her intention is public. One can then show that
Rus, 012.345.6 |= [Kaϕ ∧ [Kaϕ]Cabcc ignorant]Cabcc ignorant
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So in this case the intention is indeed realized, unlike above: the announcement
is safe. We ignore the further complication that safe announcements require
safe responses in this submission. The solution given in Section 2 consists of
the successive announcements
a announce ≡ 012a ∨ 034a ∨ 056a ∨ 135a ∨ 246a
b announce ≡ 6c
Temporal epistemic logics Two of the model checkers that we present
require interpreted system representations and / or veriﬁcation of temporal
epistemic logical formulas. Therefore, some words are in order on how these
compare to a dynamic epistemic setting.
An interpreted system I is a pair (G,R) consisting of a set of global states
G and a set of runs R relating those states. A global state g ∈ G is a tuple
consisting of local states gn for each agent and a state g of the environment.
A run r ∈ R is a sequence of global states. The m-th global state occurring
in a run r is referred to as r(m), and the local state for agent n in a global
state r(m) is written as rn(m).
A point (r,m) is a pair consisting of a run and a point in time m – this is the
proper abstract domain object when deﬁning epistemic models for interpreted
systems. In an interpreted system, agents can distinguish global states from
one another iﬀ they have the same local state in both, which induces
(r,m) ∼n (r′,m′) iﬀ r(m) ∼n r′(m′) iﬀ rn(m) = r′n(m′)
With the obvious valuation for local and environmental state values, that
deﬁnes an epistemic model. For convenience we keep writing I for that. Given
an actual point (r′,m′), we thus get an epistemic state (I, (r′,m′)). Epistemic
and (LTL) temporal (next) operators have the interpretation
I, (r,m) |= Xϕ iﬀ I, (r,m + 1) |= ϕ
I, (r,m) |= Knϕ iﬀ for all (r′,m′) : (r,m) ∼n (r′,m′) implies I, (r′,m′) |= ϕ
We now outline the relation between ‘next’ and announcement operators. An
announcement is seen as a completely observable clock tick, synchronizing the
system. Announcing ϕ at time m is simulated in I by changing the value of
some environmental variable p for exactly those points where ϕ is true, when
transiting from point (r,m) to point (r,m+1), and passing on that information
to the local states of the agents. The static information available at time m is
contained in the restriction I|m of the interpreted system I to all points for
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time m. This determines the meaning of purely epistemic formulas. But for
formulas containing epistemic and ‘next’-temporal operators the situation is
more complex. Assume that for each time m there is a formula ϕ such that the
only transitions allowed at m are those induced by announcement of ϕ. We
can deﬁne a translation ∗ where, given an epistemic state and a formula, each
X-operator in that formula is replaced by a corresponding dynamic operator
[ϕ]. The following now are all equivalent
if I, (r,m) |= ϕ, then I, (r,m) |= Xψ
if I, (r,m) |= ϕ, then I, (r,m + 1) |= ψ
if I|m, (r,m) |= ϕ∗, then I|m|ϕ∗, (r,m) |= ψ∗
I|m, (r,m) |= [ϕ∗]ψ∗
In case ϕ and ψ are both purely epistemic, so that ϕ∗ = ϕ, and ψ∗ = ψ, we
have that
I, (r,m + 1) |= ψ corresponds to I|m|ϕ, (r,m) |= ψ
It is interesting to observe, that checking ψ in the former involves (given
synchronous perfect recall) the entire domain of I|(m + 1), whereas checking
ψ in the latter only involves the ϕ-states of its predecessor I|m, corresponding
to only one value of the environmental variable that is reset in the transition
from m to m + 1. For ‘Russian Cards’, the ﬁrst announcement reduces the
domain from 140 to 20 points, and the second from 20 to 3 points.
3 Model Checker MCK
MCK, for ‘Model Checking Knowledge’, is a prototype model checker for tem-
poral and knowledge speciﬁcations, developed by Peter Gammie and Ron van
der Meyden [7]. The overall setup supposes a number of agents acting in an
environment, by temporal development. This is modelled by an interpreted
system where agents perform actions according to a protocol. Actions and the
environment may be only partially observable at each instant in time.
Diﬀerent approaches to the temporal and epistemic interaction and de-
velopment are implemented. Knowledge may be based on current obser-
vations only, on current observations and clock value, and on the history
of all observations and clock value. The last corresponds to synchronous
perfect recall. We have used that approach. In the temporal dimension,
the speciﬁcation formulas may describe the evolution of the system along
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a single computation, i.e., using linear time temporal logic (LTL), or they
may describe the branching structure of all possible computations, i.e, us-
ing branching time or computation tree logic (CTL). We have used LTL. See
http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~mck/ for more information.
Russian Cards in MCK In MCK, we have to reinterpret the dynamic
epistemics of Section 2 in temporal epistemic terms. In a program rus.mck
we successively introduce environmental variables and initialize those; we cre-
ate three agents A, B, and C with corresponding protocols "anne", "bill"
and "cath"; a main part of the program speciﬁes the (temporal) transitions,
induced by card dealing and the announcements, that relate diﬀerent infor-
mation states for these players; ﬁnally rus.mck contains a part with various
to be veriﬁed properties of the timelines created.
A hand of cards of an agent is encoded by a list of seven booleans, for
example a hand : Bool[7] speciﬁes for all of the cards 0, ..., 6 whether
they are held by Anne or not, such that anne cards[0] is true when Anne
holds card 0, etc. Initially, such variables are set to false.
Agent A, for Anne, is created by
agent A "anne" (a_hand, a_announce, b_announce, stage)
The name of the agent is A. It uses protocol "anne". It can interact with,
and potentially observe the variables between parentheses. The ﬁrst of those
is, obviously, only observable by Anne, the others will reappear in the other
agent deﬁnitions, as they are publicly observable. The variable stage is the
‘clock tick’.
The transitions part of rus.mck specify what happens in diﬀerent stages
of the execution of the protocol. We distinguish stages (clock ticks) 0, 1, 2,
and 3. In stage 0 the cards are dealt to the players, in the order 0, ..., 6. We
show it up to the dealing of card 0.
stage == 0 ->
begin if
na < 3 -> begin a_hand[0]:=True; na:= na+1 end []
nb < 3 -> begin b_hand[0]:=True; nb:= nb+1 end []
nc == 0 -> begin c_hand[0]:=True; nc:= 1 end
fi;
Variables na, nb, and nc are counters to record how many cards agents have,
and [] means nondeterministic choice. In this part of the transitions, 140
diﬀerent deals are created, represented as 140 diﬀerent timelines.
In stage 1, Anne announces that her hands is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, and
246. This is done indirectly by executing the protocol "anne", that contains a
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condition corresponding to these ﬁve deals, which causes the action Announce
to be executed. This then results in the atom a announce becoming true.
stage == 1 /\ A.Announce -> a_announce := True
In stage 2, Bill announces that Cath holds card 6. Alternatively, one can
model that Bill announces Cath’s card – whatever it is. Bill’s announcement
is by way of an action B.Announce, and results in the variable b announce
to become true. This is the transition to stage 3, the ﬁnal stage. We can
imagine the whole system to consist of 140 diﬀerent runs. Whether variables
a announce and b announce are true in stage 2 and stage 3, respectively,
depends on the deal in that run.
The protocol for Anne is
protocol "anne" (cards: observable Bool[7],
a_announce: observable Bool, b_announce: observable Bool,
stage: observable Counter)
begin
skip; if
( (cards[0] /\ cards[1] /\ cards[2]) \/
(cards[0] /\ cards[3] /\ cards[4]) \/
(cards[0] /\ cards[5] /\ cards[6]) \/
(cards[1] /\ cards[3] /\ cards[5]) \/
(cards[2] /\ cards[4] /\ cards[6]) )
-> <<Announce>>
fi
end
The ‘begin-end’ part of this protocol speciﬁes for each of the stages 0, 1, and
2 what happens in that stage. In stage 0 nothing happens: skip. In stage
1, the action Announce – that is, whatever is found between << and >> –
is executed. Actually, the value or instance of cards for Anne is a cards;
see above, where Anne is created. Alternatively to ﬁve actual hands, a much
longer protocol creates ﬁve arbitrary hands of cards based on Anne’s actual
hand. Nothing is speciﬁed for stage 2: this is therefore skip again by default.
Bill has a similar protocol but his protocol starts with skip ; skip, as his
announcement is in stage 2. And Cath does not act at all, which carries the
protocol skip ; skip ; skip.
The knowledge of the agents evolves with every stage, via the agents’
limited access to the environment. Initially, they only observe their own hand
of cards, and Anne’s and Bill’s public announcement is accessed by all agents.
Anne cannot distinguish two states iﬀ her observations are the same in those
states. For example, in stage 1 Anne cannot distinguish the timelines for deals
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012.345.6 and 012.346.5, because: both have the same a hand values (for all
seven variables), a announce is true in both cases, and b announce is false
is both cases. But in stage 3, Anne can distinguish these timelines, since
b announce is true for the former and false for the latter.
A ﬁnal part of rus.mck lists various temporal epistemic properties to be
checked. For example, we want to verify that Rus, 012.345.6 |= [a announce]
[b announce]Caba knows bs. The current version (0.2.0) of MCK does not sup-
port common knowledge operators for speciﬁcation in the perfect recall mod-
ule. Therefore we verify instead that in stage 3, a knows bs is valid in the
model. This corresponds to Rus|a announce|b announce |= a knows bs which
ensures that Rus|a announce|b announce, 012.345.6 |= Cabca knows bs. And in
this speciﬁc model Caba knows bs ↔ Cabca knows bs is also valid.
spec_spr_xn = X 3 ( (a_announce /\ b_announce) =>
( (((Knows A b_hand[0]) \/ (Knows A neg b_hand[0]))) /\
(...)
(((Knows A b_hand[6]) \/ (Knows A neg b_hand[6]))) ))
The part spec spr xn means that we are using the perfect recall module of
MCK, and X 3 is the triple ‘next state’ temporal operator, counting from
stage 0. Therefore, the formula bound by the operator is checked in stage 3.
Similarly, other properties of the ﬁve hands protocol are veriﬁed.
4 Model Checker DEMO
The tool DEMO is developed by Jan van Eijck [18]. DEMO is short for Dy-
namic Epistemic MOdelling. It allows modelling epistemic updates, graphical
display of Kripke structures involved (i.e., epistemic or state models, and ac-
tion models that represent epistemic actions), formula evaluation in epistemic
states, etc. Epistemic models are minimized under bisimulation, and action
models are minimized under the (more appropriate, weaker) notion of action
emulation [19]. DEMO is written in the functional programming language
Haskell. See also http://www.cwi.nl/~jve/papers/04/demo/.
The model checker DEMO implements the dynamic epistemic logic of [2].
In this ‘action model logic’ the global state of the multi-agent system is rep-
resented by an epistemic model (multi-agent Kripke model), and the agents’
action is represented by an action model. An action model is also based on
a multi-agent Kripke frame, but instead of carrying a valuation it has a pre-
condition function which assigns a precondition to each point in the action
model, which stands for an atomic action. The state change in the system is
via an operation called update product. This is a restricted modal product.
In this submission we restrict our attention to action models for public an-
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nouncements. Such action models have a singleton domain. We refrain from
details and proceed with the recursive deﬁnition of formulas in DEMO.
Form = Top | Prop Prop | Neg Form | Conj [Form] | Disj [Form]
| K Agent Form | CK [Agent] Form
Formula Top stands for , Prop Prop for atomic propositional letters (the ﬁrst
occurrence of Prop means that the datatype is ‘propositional atom’, whereas
the second occurrence of Prop is the placeholder for an actual proposition
letter, such as P0), Neg for negation, Conj [Form] stands for the conjunction
of a list of formulas of type Form, similarly for Disj, K Agent stands for the
individual knowledge operator for agent Agent, and CK [Agent] for common
knowledge operator for the group of agents listed in [Agent].
A pointed (and singleton) action model for a public announcement is cre-
ated by a function public with a precondition (formula) as argument. The
update operation is speciﬁed as
upd :: EpistM -> PoAM -> EpistM
Here, EpistM is an epistemic state and PoAM is a pointed action model. The
update generates a new epistemic state as speciﬁed above. Formula checking
is deﬁned as
isTrue :: EpistM -> Form -> Bool
Its arguments are an epistemic state and a formula, and it returns a boolean
value.
Russian Cards in DEMO In DEMO, one is restricted to propositional
letters starting with lower case p, q and r, so we cannot write, for example, 0a
for the atomic proposition that Anne holds card 0, as in Section 2. Instead,
atoms {p, . . . , p6, q, . . . , q6, r, . . . , r6} represent such atomic propositions. The
name p4 – Anne holds card 4 – actually stands for Prop (P 4), etc. Instead
of p0 we write, somewhat arbritrarily, p, and similarly for q and r.
The initial epistemic state rus representing the knowledge in card deal
012.345.6 is constructed as follows. A set of integers [0..139] represents the
140 diﬀerent deals. Each integer is associated with seven propositional letters
– the valuation of facts in that state. The ﬁrst two deals correspond to the
valuations
(0,[P 0,P 1,P 2,Q 3,Q 4,Q 5,R 6]),
(1,[P 0,P 1,P 2,Q 3,Q 4,Q 6,R 5])
The deal numbered 0 stands for actual deal 012.345.6. A pair of two integers is
in the accessibility relation for an agent n, if that agent holds the same cards in
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both deals. Two such pairs for Anne are (a,0,0),(a,0,1). DEMO assumes
arbitrary accessibility relations. So, unfortunately, we have to explicitly list
all pairs in the equivalence relation for each agent, as above.
Anne’s public announcement a announce corresponds to the following sin-
gleton action model named a announce, which is produced by the function
public.
public( K a (Disj[Conj[p,p1,p2],Conj[p,p3,p4],Conj[p,p5,p6],
Conj[p1,p3,p5],Conj[p2,p4,p6]]))
Similarly, we have an action model b announce for Bill’s announcement b announce.
The postcondition that Anne knows Bill’s hand of cards, a knows bs, is repre-
sented as
aknowsbs = Conj[ Disj[K a q, K a (Neg q) ],
Disj[K a q1, K a (Neg q1) ],
Disj[K a q2, K a (Neg q2) ],
Disj[K a q3, K a (Neg q3) ],
Disj[K a q4, K a (Neg q4) ],
Disj[K a q5, K a (Neg q5) ],
Disj[K a q6, K a (Neg q6) ] ]
Similarly for b knows as and c ignorant. The model checker now veriﬁes the
postconditions of the constructed models. After Bill’s announcement it is
common knowledge to Anne and Bill that Anne knows Bill’s hand of cards,
and it is also common knowledge to Anne and Bill that Bill knows Anne’s
hand of cards. It is publicly known that Cath remains ignorant:
*RUS>isTrue (upd (upd rus a_announce) b_announce) (CK [a,b] a_knows_bs)
True
*RUS>isTrue (upd (upd rus a_announce) b_announce) (CK [a,b] b_knows_as)
True
*RUS>isTrue (upd (upd rus a_announce) b_announce) (CK [a,b,c] c_ignorant)
True
Epistemic state (upd rus a announce) is the result of updating the initial
epistemic state rus with singleton pointed action model with precondition
a announce – to improve readability we have chosen to name the action model
a announce and not the precondition. The epistemic state (upd (upd rus
a announce) b announce) is the result of updating epistemic state (upd rus
a announce) with the singleton pointed action model named b announce (with
that precondition).
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5 Model Checker MCMAS
MCMAS presumably stands for Model Checking Multi-Agent Systems. This
model checker has been developed by Franco Raimondi and Alessio Lomus-
cio [11]. The current version is mcmas 0.6. System descriptions and pro-
tocol properties are veriﬁed using ordered binary decision diagrams, compa-
rable to the approach used in MCK. It extends existing obdd-based tech-
niques for reactive systems by adding both an epistemic (ATL) and a deon-
tic dimension to the logical language, and allowing input in terms of inter-
preted systems. MCMAS is implemented in C++. For more information, see
http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/F.Raimondi/MCMAS/.
In MCMAS, the global state is represented as a tuple of the local states of
the agents. For Russian Cards, agents Anne, Bill, and Cath represent players,
and an agent Env (the environment) represents the card deal. The local state
of agent Anne requires ﬁve components, that can be seen as variables; three
represent her hand of cards, and two the status quo and outcome of the two
announcements. Version 0.6 of MCMAS does not support variables in the
description of agents’ local states. Therefore we encode the variable parts in a
single string. For example, one local state for Anne is a012tf. This means that
Anne holds cards 0,1, and 2, that Anne’s announcement a announce has been
(truthfully) made in the global state of which this local state is a component,
and that Bill’s announcement b announce could not be made (was false) in
that global state. Similarly, we have ﬁve variables for Bill, and three variables
for Cath. The local state of the agent Env has seven variables, because it
represent a card deal. An example is e0123456. This stands for the actual
deal 012.345.6.
The information changes take the usual steps: (1) the cards are revealed to
the agents, (2) Anne announces a announce, and (3) Bill announces b announce.
All reachable global states will be included in the next stage. An example ini-
tial global state is (annnnn, bnnnnn, cnnn, e0123456); an ‘n’ essentially
means that the agent has no information on the value of corresponding vari-
able, modelled by giving the variable that value n. So, bnnnnn means that
Bill’s local state is that he does not know his cards yet (the ﬁrst three n’s),
that Anne has not made her announcement yet (the fourth n) and that Bill has
not made his announcement yet. The above global state (annnnn, bnnnnn,
cnnn, e0123456) then transits to (a012nn, b345nn, c6nn, e0123456), where
each agent knows what cards it holds. Anne’s a announce is then made, causing
the transition to (a012tn, b345tn,c6tn, e0123456) and b announce ﬁnally
results in (a012tt, b345tt,c6tt, e0123456) – this time, Bill’s announce-
ment is successful. These state transitions are speciﬁed in the program. For
example, for agent Anne, the transition for step one is as follows; Lstate is
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the local state of (current) agent Anne, and Env.Lstate is the local state of
Env.
a012nn if (Lstate=annnnn and
( Env.Lstate=e0123456 or Env.Lstate=e0123465 or
Env.Lstate=e0123564 or Env.Lstate=e0124563 ));
The environment Env does not change during transitions, but this has to be
made explicit as
e0123456 if Lstate=e0123456;
In the ‘valuation’ part of an MCMAS program we deﬁne what can be seen as
(the denotation of) atomic propositions. For example
ab_d0123456 if (Anne.Lstate=a012tt and Bill.Lstate=b345tt and
Cath.Lstate=c6tt and Env.Lstate=e0123456);
is the atom that is (uniquely) true in the global state (a012tt, b345tt,c6tt,
e0123456). Similarly, atoms expressing card ownership such as 0a for ‘Anne
holds card 0’ are deﬁned by enormous expressions starting as (and consisting
of 60 alternative card deals)
a0 if (Env.Lstate=e0123456 or Env.Lstate=e0123465 or ...
Groups of agents can be named too. This is useful when checking common
knowledge. For example, expression ABC={Anne, Bill, Cath}; gives the
group consisting of Anne, Bill, and Cath the label ABC. The common knowledge
formula Cabc(0a → Ka0a) is then represented as CK(ABC,a0->K(Anne,a0)).
We conclude this short exposition with the postcondition Cabcc ignorant that
veriﬁes that Cath remains ignorant after both announcements have been made
– ‘!’ stands for negation.
ab_d0123456 -> GCK(ABC,(
( !K(Cath,a0) and !K(Cath,b0) ) and
( !K(Cath,a1) and !K(Cath,b1) ) and
( !K(Cath,a2) and !K(Cath,b2) ) and
( !K(Cath,a3) and !K(Cath,b3) ) and
( !K(Cath,a4) and !K(Cath,b4) ) and
( !K(Cath,a5) and !K(Cath,b5) ) and
( !K(Cath,a6) and !K(Cath,b6) ) ));
6 Comparison
Rough performance results for the input scripts described above are based on
a PC conﬁguration Linux 2.4.30 i686 Pentium 4, 800Mhz and 2018M RAM.
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The times required, respectively, for the Russian Cards ﬁve hands protocol,
as an average over ﬁve runs, are:
• MCK – 160 seconds (Long BDD package) or 109 seconds (CUDD BDD
package)
• MCMAS – 117 seconds (CUDD BDD package)
• DEMO – 9 seconds
The time measure for MCK and MCMAS is for the whole model checking
process, i.e., both model construction and formula checking. For MCMAS it
includes the time to autogenerate the MCMAS input script from a C program.
DEMO operates on slightly diﬀerent principles: First, the Haskell interpreter
compiles RUS.hs and related modules DPLL and DEMO. Only then, we check
individual formulas. We measured the combined autogeneration, compilation
and checking steps.
These results cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as indicative of the
relative performance of the model checkers, however, as they are based on
rather diﬀerent modellings and model checking questions. One diﬀerence is
that the MCK input script explicitly represents the dealing of cards using a
transition program, whereas the input to MCMAS and DEMO already have
the results of a deal explicitly represented in the initial states. Another is that
MCK and MCMAS check a temporal property for all initial states, whereas
DEMO checks a dynamic property at a single initial state. The runtimes can
also be quite sensitive to speciﬁc choices made in the modelling. Apart from
the scripts discussed in this contribution, we later developed a much more
concise DEMO program, as well as an alternate MCK modelling in which the
dealing of cards is represented by a constraint on initial states rather than
by a program. We refrain from details and refer instead to the companion
website. The complexity results for these versions are
• DEMO-new – 4 seconds
• MCK-new – 1.1 seconds (Long BDD), 0.27 seconds (CUDD)
The modellings discussed above focus on announcements for the speciﬁc
situation of the deal 012.345.6. We have also developed an MCK script mod-
elling a protocol that provides an ﬁve hands announcement for Anne for an
arbitrary initial state. This script currently requires about 3 hours to run, and
is still a subject of our experiments.
Mostly, however, we were interested in how versatile the tools appeared to
be, to implement a problem that was originally formulated in local, and dy-
namic epistemic, terms, into temporal epistemic terms and/or as an inter-
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preted system. In other words, we were more than anything else interested in
development time and supported functionality. Conclusions based on our ex-
periences are extremely tentative. Implementing the Russian Cards problem
in DEMO took about half a day, for Ji Ruan, who is an expert in DEMO.
MCK scripts developed by Ron van der Meyden, expert in MCK, also took
about half a day. Currently, MCK does not support common knowledge (in
the used module), nor epistemic preconditions, nor preconditions to temporal
formulas. The last makes it impossible to have knowledge preconditions to
players’ announcements. Such preconditions are always epistemic, as agents
only announce what they know to be true. Also, unsuccessful updates – for-
mulas that become false because they are announced – cannot be made visible
in the way they have to be checked in MCK: the analogue is a conditional for-
mula where the antecedent is also a subformula of the temporal consequent.
On the other hand, MCK allows a very natural formalization of protocols –
this is not, or less, possible in DEMO or MCMAS. The ‘fully interpreted sys-
tem’ approach of MCMAS is very transparent, but the models that need to
be built are ‘very’ large: (automated input of) thousands of lines of code, as
opposed to (manual input of) about a hundred lines of code in MCK. More
than anything, this case-study increased our insight into the state of the art
in epistemic model checking, and our understanding of the theoretical issues
involved in card cryptography, emerging from the need to reformulate these
issues in diﬀerent logics.
7 Conclusions
We have implemented the ﬁve hands protocol to solve the Russian Cards
problem in the model checkers MCK, DEMO, and MCMAS. Dynamic epis-
temic requirements can be easily reformalized in temporal epistemic terms,
a necessary requirement for formalization in MCK and MCMAS. The model
checkers vary in how easy, or diﬃcult, it is to build the initial epistemic state,
in how diﬃcult it is to formalize announcements and execute them in that
initial state, and in how to verify protocol properties. We intend to pursue
this investigation by implementing more complex protocols and verifying more
complex properties for such ‘card cryptography’, and generalize it to the level
of interpreted systems with agent dependencies, where groups of agents aim
to share their local state value while keeping it a secret from the remaining
agents.
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